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It is generally agreed that boards are endogenously determined institutions that serve both an 
oversight and advisory role in a firm.  While oversight role of boards has been extensively studied 
relatively few studies have examined the advisory role of corporate boards. In this study we 
examine the participation of “political” directors on the boards of natural gas companies between 
1930 and 1998.
  We focus on the 1938, and 1954 regulation and 1986 partial deregulation of the 
natural gas industry. Using datasets covering the period from 1930 to 1990 and 1978 to 1998, we 
test whether regulation and deregulation altered the composition of companies’ boards as the firms’ 
environment changed. In particular, did regulation cause an increase and deregulation a decrease, in 
the number of “political” directors on corporate boards? We find evidence that the number of 
“political” directors increases as firms shift from market to political competition.  Specifically the 
regulation of natural gas is associated with an increase in the number of “political” directors and 
the deregulation is associated with a decrease in the number of “political” directors on boards.   
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I. Introduction 
The basic unit of analysis in corporate governance is the board of directors.  Directors 
monitor, advise, punish and reward.  Given these different tasks it is not surprising that the typical 
corporate board includes members with quite diverse backgrounds.
1  Directors typically come from 
other industries (such as banking), medicine, the academy, law and politics (Klein (1998)).  Neither 
the advisory role nor the diversity of background which that role would seem to produce has been 
the focus of studies of corporate governance.  Instead, most have focused on the role of outside 
directors (those not having other business ties to the firm) regardless of their backgrounds, in 
solving agency problems between the CEO and shareholders (see Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) 
for a survey).  Only recently have some studies begun to examine the advisory role of boards and 
its impact on the diversity of directors’ backgrounds.
2  These studies generally find that the external 
environment of the firm (or its economic needs to use Klein’s terminology) determines the type of 
outside director chosen by the firm.  Most of these studies, however, have been cross-sectional in 
nature (Klein (1998) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001)).
3 
Unlike studies such as Kole and Lehn (1999) and Geddes and Vinod (2002) that focus on 
the general adaptation of board structures to regulation and deregulation, this paper examines the 
advisory role of political directors on corporate boards by examining the effect on board 
composition of specific changes in the firms’ external environment: specifically, changes in 
regulation.  If political directors' value is primarily related to their knowledge of or connections to 
the regulatory process, we would expect such directors to be more valuable once comprehensive 
regulation begins and less valuable post-deregulation.  
We use two datasets to evaluate the role of external environment in determining board 
composition.  The first is derived from Moody's Industrial Manuals for 1930, 40, 50, 55, 60, 70, 
                                                 
1 In Germany, for example, corporations have two boards, one to monitor the management of the firm and the second to assist 
management in the operation of the firm.   2 
80, and 90.  The second uses annual data derived from proxy statements filed with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the period 1978-98.  We test whether the 
imposition of regulation in 1938 and 1954, and subsequent deregulation in 1986, altered 
composition of the board.  In particular, did the regulatory events lead firms to increase the number 
of “political” directors on their boards in the earlier periods and then reduce the number of 
“political” directors post-deregulation? 
In both datasets we find evidence that some board members serve a political role and that 
changes in the external environment change the demand for directors.  After regulation (either 1938 
or 1954 depending on the firms’ lines of business), the data show a marked increase in the number 
of political directors.  Moreover, the 1986 deregulation of natural gas extraction is associated with 
a decrease in the number of “political” directors on the boards of extraction companies, while the 
number of political directors on firms in other regulated segments of the industry is not affected by 
the deregulation of extraction.  The results are confirmed using a fixed effects model and a model 
examining only newly appointed directors.  Specifically, we find that “political” regulators are less 
likely to be added to a board after deregulation. 
The paper proceeds in Section 2 with a review of the literature on the determinants of 
corporate board composition and a brief history of regulation in the natural gas industry.  In Section 
3 we discuss the data sources and conduct a preliminary analysis of the data.  Section 4 presents 
our predictions and estimation results for both event periods using the Moody's data and the proxy 
statement data.  Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
II. Deregulation and Board Composition 
2.1 Board composition and the firm’s external environment  
An operating assumption of much of the corporate governance literature is that boards are 
endogenously determined institutions (Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), Romano (1996)).  The 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Klein (1998) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001).   3 
primary focus of this literature has been on the role of the board in mitigating the agency conflicts 
between CEO and shareholders (Fama and Jensen (1983)).  If boards exist to monitor shirking by 
the CEO and management, then outside directors should be more effective monitors than are 
employees (see Demsetz and Lehn (1985) Weisbach (1988), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)).  
Based on this premise, much of this literature focuses on the proportion of outside directors and the 
link between performance and corporate governance (Bhagat and Black, 2000). 
Exceptions to this focus are Klein (1998) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), which focus on 
the advisory role of the board.  Although the monitoring versus advising theories are by no means 
disparate, the advising literature focuses on the human capital that directors bring to the company.  
Board members’ human capital is important not merely because it allows board members to better 
detect shirking by the CEO, but also because it gives the CEO independent advice he or she might 
not get from full time employees (Coase (1937), Williamson (1975) and Demsetz (1991)).  In 
addition, the board may represent part time employment for highly skilled labor.  The company 
may not need the services of an investment banker or lobbyist on a day-to-day basis, but their 
presence on the board means the company has placed them on a sort of retainer (Mace (1971), 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001)). In short the firm’s external environment or “economic needs” 
determine at least in part who is chosen as a director. 
One of the most important aspects of a firm’s external environment is the presence or 
absence of regulation.  There are a number of reasons why regulation may change the external 
environment of the firm, but all suggest that regulation shifts the focus of the firm, at least to some 
degree, from market competition to political competition. At least since Stigler (1971), economists 
have examined the ways in which regulation can benefit an industry. Peltzman (1976) and Posner 
(1974) model regulation as a competition for rents.  Such competition would imply that “political” 
directors are added to the board to assist the firm in capturing these regulatory rents. In this context, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) utilize 3 cross sections from 1987, 88 and 1999.   4 
there are many hypotheses for the appointment of political directors to the corporate board.  Spiller 
(1990) posits that post industry employment provides the regulator a reward for favorable 
regulatory treatment.  He finds that regulators who preside over more lenient regulatory periods are 
more likely to receive post industry employment.  “Political” directors also represent a method of 
lobbying regulatory agencies.  
Rent seeking could also be defensive in nature.  “Political” directors may be added to the 
board to protect quasi-rents from regulation (McChesney (1997)).  This theory proposes that 
regulation has the potential to destroy firm specific assets.  Lobbying is used not to gain monopoly 
rents but to protect the firm's assets from expropriation or dissipation.
4 In addition, “political” 
directors may possess industry specific knowledge or insight into the political process or the threat 
of future regulation (see Agrawal and Knoeber (2001)). This industry knowledge may make former 
regulators effective monitors of corporate management.  In each case, regulation produces a need 
for directors who know something about the political landscape and the regulatory horizon to serve 
on the board in an advisory role. 
An alternative to the external environment theory is that a director’s background presence is 
unrelated to the firms’ external environment.  There are several reasons why firms’ external 
environment might not affect the composition of its board.  The first reason is that directors serve 
only a monitoring function. After all, the board is designed to serve an oversight role and most 
companies have access to information from salaried employees. The basic prediction of this 
alternative is that that regulation would not affect the likelihood that political directors are present 
on a board.  For example, if former regulators have special industry knowledge or management 
expertise, that value would not necessarily increase with regulation nor dissipate with deregulation. 
                                                 
4 More recently, economists have considered the possibility that the revolving door might have a beneficial effect, since many 
regulated industries face a sunk cost problem.  Once a firm installs firm-specific capital, the regulator can force the firm to price at 
marginal cost rather than including the sunk cost of the asset.  Post-government employment is a solution to the sunk capital problem 
as regulators then have a stake in the long-term health of the firms they regulate (see Salant (1995) and Che (1995)).   5 
One other alternative is that many directors are simply window dressing whose sole 
function is to provide another outside director who will not cause problems for management. This 
hypothesis is problematic for our examination of regulations impact on board composition. Several 
studies have suggested that regulated firms may be less actively monitored by shareholders than 
firms in a competitive market.
5  It is possible that political directors are neither more effective 
monitors than other types of directors nor involved in rent seeking activities, but are on the boards 
of regulated industries because there is less market pressure to appoint more effective monitors and 
greater opportunities for shirking by the CEO's of regulated companies.  In effect, regulated firms 
need or simply have less effective monitoring by their boards than firms that are not regulated.  If 
this is the case, “political” directors are simply window dressing.  They are placed on the board for 
the same reason as relatives of the CEO; they are unlikely to cause trouble for management.  For 
this reason, we also estimate the impact of deregulation on the overall composition of boards and 
on the proportion of insiders. 
2.2 From Market to Political Competition:  A Primer on Natural Gas Regulation 
  The business environment of natural gas companies has changed dramatically over the 
history of the industry. The natural gas industry does not truly begin until the mid-1920s, although 
gas was used in a number of cities that happened to be located near a gas field.  Moving natural gas 
over long distances was practically impossible until the mid-1920s when metallurgical advances 
allowed for the manufacture of pipe that could withstand the pressure that made long distance 
pipelines feasible.  Prior to the mid-1920s natural gas was a byproduct of oil production and, 
particularly in the southwest, it was often more profitable to burn off the gas than to sell it.  By the 
1930s a vast network of pipelines had been created. The holding companies that owned the network 
usually purchased gas from independent producers although a sizable percentage of the gas came 
from pipeline companies’ own properties.  As a practical matter most producers had only one 
                                                 
5 See Kole and Lehn (1999) and Geddes and Vinod (2002).   6 
pipeline outlet.  The Great Depression created further political problems for the gas industry as 
industry consolidation was perceived as creating monopoly prices and shortages in the northeast 
while an enormous oversupply in the southwest illuminated the night sky over large natural gas 
fields. 
  Federal regulation of the natural gas industry began in 1938 with the Natural Gas Act,
6 
which gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC) authority to regulate the prices pipeline 
companies charged local distribution companies.
7 The Act arose to fill a gap in state regulatory 
control over local utility rates.  Because natural gas pipelines crossed state lines the courts had been 
reluctant to allow individual states to regulate them. Thus if a local distributor purchased gas from 
an unaffiliated interstate pipeline, the local regulatory agency could not set the transportation 
charge.  This transportation charge was often substantial and during this period constituted the 
major determinant of the local customer’s bill. Independent producers also argued that the pipeline 
system forced them to sell their gas at prices below cost (Sanders, 1981, p. 33). 
  Initial efforts at regulation proved controversial.  The Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, 
which dramatically altered the structure of public utility systems, was a particularly contentious 
battle (Sanders, 1981).
8  By contrast the Natural Gas Act of 1938 was a model of compromise.  The 
pipeline companies came under federal regulation, but in a last minute concession to the pipelines 
to assure their political support, the FPC was to require certification of any pipeline construction if 
an existing pipeline already served the market.  The Natural Gas Act of 1938 made the creation of 
monopoly political payment for price regulation.  Sanders (1981) states, 
                                                 
6 Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 76-688, 52 Stat. 821 (June 21, 1938) 
7 This section draws heavily on the discussion of the natural gas industry found in Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1997), Bradley 
(1996), Breyer (1982) and Sanders (1981). 
8 As Sanders notes “Between 1935 and 1947, 306 subsidiary utility companies were spun off by the reorganization process.  One 
hundred and thirteen of these were gas companies.  Fifteen years after the act, holding company control of interstate pipeline 
mileage was reduced from 80% to 18%.  Interstate pipelines constructed after 1935 often owned substantial gas producing 
properties, but were seldom integrated with distributing utilities. After the mid-1940s, there was also a sharply declining trend in 
pipeline ownership of properties.  The result of this profound change in the structure of the natural gas industry was that producers, 
transporters (pipelines) and distributors (local utilities) of gas came to have very different interests in regulation.  Both pipelines and   7 
 
“Like much of the economic regulation initiated during the New Deal, the original Natural Gas Act 
of 1938 was ambiguously worded, highly discretionary, and quite acceptable to both the regulated 
industry and the consuming public” 
 
The Act originally covered only the prices of natural gas associated with the transportation and sale 
for distribution to customers.  It did not cover wellhead sales by independent producers. 
  Although the pipeline industry had by all accounts accepted regulation, the period 1938-
1954 was in fact a period of growing contention within the regulatory process.  There are several 
reasons for this growing contention.  The first, and most obvious, was that the pipeline industry’s 
effectiveness in winning entry barriers made lobbying to prevent entry a standard part of the 
pipeline business. Sanders (1981, p. 49) notes the example of a spokesman for a company planning 
to build a pipeline from Texas to Wisconsin who testified before the House Commerce Committee 
that his company was lobbying the FPC for certification in order to block entry by competitors that 
the state of Wisconsin appeared to favor.
9 
  The second major source of political contention in the 1938-54 period was state regulators.  
A growing conservation movement in the states, where conservation literally meant to restrict 
supply, had begun to affect producers.  The most aggressive efforts to raise price by rationing 
occurred in Texas, under the Texas Railroad Commission, and Oklahoma, under the Oklahoma 
Corporate Commission. In 1935 the Interstate Oil Compact was ratified by Texas, Oklahoma, New 
Mexico, Kansas, Illinois and Colorado to enforce conservation practices.  Although the states 
generally failed in their efforts, largely due to expanded production in non-member states, the FPC 
regularly denied certification to pipeline companies if the pipeline would harm “conservation” 
efforts (Sanders, 1981 and Bradley, 1996). 
                                                                                                                                                                 
utilities would prefer a low and stable price level for gas as a commodity-a position diametrically opposed to that of independent 
producers of gas.” (Sanders, 1981 p38) 
9 Sanders (1981) and Bradley (1996) both note that permits also become necessary to finance new pipelines as the Holding Company 
Act of 1935 hampered internal financing.   8 
  The final source of contention proved the most important.  In the period 1938-1954 the gas 
industry expanded dramatically. The number of households using natural gas increased from 8,348 
in 1937 to 21,084 in 1955 (Sanders, 1981).  With this rise in consumption came a rise in price so 
that, where transport cost had made up the majority of a customer’s bill in 1938, by the 1950s the 
fuel cost constituted the majority.  By the late 1940s calls were being heard in Congress to extend 
regulation to producers.  Compounding these demands was the regional structure of the natural gas 
industry that had evolved during the period.  As the Appalachian gas fields dried up, production 
shifted to the southwest, which, due to the 1935 Holding Company Act, pitted the three distinct 
segments of the industry—production, transport and distribution—against each other in Congress. 
At several points during the late 1940s the FPC commissioners tried to expand their 
regulatory authority to include producer prices.  The Natural Gas Act of 1938 is ambiguous in its 
wording and, in theory at least, could be interpreted to allow the FPC to control wellhead prices.  
Producer states in the late 1940s grew concerned, and on two occasions tried to enact legislation 
that would clarify that the FPC did not have the authority to regulate the prices charged by 
independent producers.
10  In 1949 the Harris-Kerr bill passed the House and Senate only to be 
vetoed by President Truman.  The breakdown of House voting is shown in Figure 1.  The bill was 
favored by producer states (South and West) and opposed by consumer states (North, Midwest and 
East).  Even before it was established that natural gas regulation extended to the producer, it was 
obvious that regulation would be redistributive. 
The FPC's authority was greatly expanded following Philips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 
(1954), which granted the commission authority to regulate the price at which field producers sold 
gas to pipelines.
11 The court’s ruling overturned an FPC ruling that it could not regulate unaffiliated 
producers.  Nevertheless, the FPC post Philips controlled prices all the way from extraction to the 
                                                 
10 The first of these was the Moore-Rizley bill in 1947. 
11 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 681-684 (1954)   9 
sale of gas to local distribution companies.  Prior to Philips the FPC had authority over a few 
hundred pipelines.  Post Philips it controlled the prices charged by thousands of independent 
producers.  The Philips decision was regulatory redistribution via the courts and Congress quickly 
sought to reverse it.  In 1955, William Fulbright and Oren Harris introduced a deregulation bill.  
The results of the House vote on deregulation are shown in Figure 2.  Although the 1955 bill was 
less far reaching (it allowed some regulatory controls on producer prices), the vote mirrors the 1949 
vote.  Again the bill was vetoed, this time by President Eisenhower.
12 
Initially the FPC tried to set rates on a case-by-case basis.  By the 1960s, however, the FPC 
was setting prices for whole regions rather than on a firm-by-firm basis. The rates charged in the 
1950s seem to have been influenced by the Republican control of Congress (Sanders 1981), with 
prices favoring producers. By the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, however, the FPC was 
attempting systematic reductions in prices and the redistribution had begun in force. The rate 
hearing process involved considerable discretion for regulators and frequently ended in Federal 
Court.  The system began to unravel by the late 1960s when gas shortages began to emerge in the 
northeast (Sanders (1981) and Breyer, (1982)).  During the “oil crisis” of the early 1970s, the 
shortage problem became particularly acute as the rate setting process failed to keep prices in line 
with inflation let alone natural gas demand. 
Congress responded with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which stipulated the gradual 
decontrol of prices for new gas wells (those drilled after 1977), let prices grow at the rate of 
inflation, and moved control of natural gas prices from the FPC to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).
13 Deregulation of extraction companies did not proceed quickly.  Prices for 
new deep wells were deregulated in 1979.  Not until 1985 were all new wells deregulated.  Finally, 
                                                 
12 The reason given for the veto was that South Dakota Senator Francis Chase claimed in a speech that a Washington lawyer in the 
employ of the oil producers offered him a $2,500 contribution in exchange for his vote.  Eisenhower claimed he could not tolerate 
the scandal and vetoed the bill. 
13 Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (Nov. 9, 1978)   10 
all extraction was deregulated in 1986 by FERC Order 451, which set the regulated price above the 
market-clearing price.
14  In July 1989, President Bush signed the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol 
Act, which ended rate regulation by the federal government.
15 The distribution of natural gas and 
its transportation by pipeline remains regulated. 
The long history of regulation detailed above suggests one fact quite clearly: beginning in 
1938 for pipelines and distribution companies, and in 1954 for producers, the business environment 
encompassed not just the information about the gas field and customers but also Washington DC.  
If Klein (1998) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) are correct and the composition of boards 
response to the external needs of the firm, regulatory changes between 1938 and 1986 should alter 
the composition of boards to include political directors. 
For the purposes of our study, it is important to date when deregulation occurred for 
extraction companies.  Clearly, the 1978 act deregulated some portion of production.  It appears, 
however, that most extraction companies held wells that were still regulated.  Since we do not 
know the exact point at which each company’s operations were completely deregulated, we treat 
deregulation as having occurred in 1986.  Because this would tend to bias our results toward zero 
(any company that held no regulated wells may have made its governance changes earlier), we 
interpret our estimates as lower bounds. 
 
III Director Classification and Trends 
3.1 Moody's and Marquis, 1930-90 
  To create our sample of corporate boards we identify all the natural gas companies listed in 
Moody's Industrial Manual. Moody's begins near the turn of the century and is one of the most 
comprehensive industry guides in existence.  It provides varying amounts of information on all 
                                                 
14 FERC Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22168 (June 18, 1986) 
15 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (July 26, 1989)   11 
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange (the vast majority 
of publicly traded companies even in the early period of the sample).  Periodically, usually every 
10 years in the early part of the sample period, Moody's lists all the firms in the directory by 
industry.  We include all firms listed by Moody's that identify themselves as producing natural gas.  
We construct the sample of directors at ten-year increments due to the difficulty of identifying the 
directors’ biographies (see below). Although Moody's was published prior to 1930, we limit 
ourselves to 1930-1990 because of data availability (see below). We also include 1955 given the 
mid-decade expansion of regulation.  Thus constructed, our sample consists of eight observation 
years of data. 
  The chief advantage of Moody's is that it lists the names of the directors and major officers 
of the corporation. We are able to identify 6,526 directors in the sample period. Table 1 Panel A 
contains a breakdown of the sample. The major problem is that Moody’s provides no biographical 
information for directors and executives prior to the 1980s.  To obtain this information for the 
earlier years, we utilize a second data source, Marquis Who's Who in Commerce and Industry, and 
its continuation Who's Who in Finance and Industry.  The Marquis directory begins in 1938 and is 
fairly extensive in its coverage.  However, it is produced at irregular intervals.  As shown in Table 
1, between the two sources we are able to construct a sample that includes biographical data on 
more than 50% of the directors in any given observation year.   
Using the biographical information in Marquis, we broadly classify directors along two 
lines.  First, we categorize directors by their professional background.  Directors are classified as 
Washington lawyers (those indicating that they practice in Washington, DC, or are members of the 
Washington bar), non-Washington lawyers, politicians (elected representatives from either state or 
national government and non-elected officials not associated directly with regulation such as   12 
ambassadors and agency heads), and former regulators (defined as former FERC employees, 
employees of public service commissions or congressional oversight committees). 
We are also interested in whether regulation induces other changes in board composition as 
such changes also offer evidence on the importance of regulation in determining board 
composition.  For example, finding growing diversity of backgrounds among board members (i.e. 
more of other non-political director types) caused by regulation might suggest that the demand for 
regulators is not unique to their regulatory background.  For this reason we also classify directors 
as academics, accountants, bankers (either investment bankers, commercial bankers or private 
investors), CEOs of independent companies with five or more years of experience in the gas 
industry, consultants, and engineers (if they have backgrounds in engineering, chemistry or 
geology).  We also indicate that a director has gas industry experience if their primary occupation 
for at least the previous 5 years was in the natural gas or oil industry.  The background 
classifications are similar to Klein (1998) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001).   
We also indicate the board member’s business relation to the firm.  The corporate finance 
literature typically classifies directors as insiders, outsiders, or “grey”.  Grey directors are not 
employees of the firm, but have some type of business relation with the firm in addition to their 
board position (e.g., as an outside legal counsel or investment banker).  Unfortunately, such “grey” 
affiliations are not uniformly indicated in Marquis or on the earlier proxy statements (see below).  
Consequently, we classify directors 1) as inside if they are employees of the firm, 2) as retirees of 
the firm, and 3) as relatives of the current CEO.   
Finally, because different types of “political” directors may well be substitutes for one 
another (e.g., a Washington lawyer may be as effective as a former regulator) and because 
“political” backgrounds are not necessarily exclusive (about half the Washington lawyers are also   13 
former regulators), we also include the number of directors falling under several composite 
“political” categories.  
One problem with the Moody's-Marquis data is that we are limited to those directors we can 
identify in Marquis.  While there is no obvious reason why the Marquis sample should be biased, a 
non-trivial proportion of the total number of directors must be omitted from any analysis.  We 
would like some method of verifying our results with a more complete sample of biographical data. 
3.2 The Proxy Statement Sample 
Given the limitations of the Moody’s-Marquis data we supplement our analysis with an 
additional sample that consists of 96 natural gas firms. The breakdown by firm year and total 
number of directors is given in Panel B of Table 1 The sample was constructed by taking the first 
150 firms on a list extracted from COMPUSTAT of all firms in natural gas related SIC codes 
(between 1978-98).  Copies of proxy statements were obtained for each of the firms for all 
available years of operation between 1978 and 1998.  During this period, firms typically provided 
information on board members’ previous employment and relational ties to the firm (i.e. 
relatives).
16  If all 96 firms had the full twenty years of data we would have a total of 1,920 firm 
years.  We fall short of this total because 1) several firms have missing proxy statements for several 
years, making it impossible to construct the board, and 2) the majority of firms operated only for a 
subset of the sample period.  In fact we never have more than 45 firms per year in any year between 
1978-98 and for 1978 we have only 4 firms.
17 
The proxy dataset has several advantages over the Moody's-Marquis sample and one major 
disadvantage.  The major advantages are that it is easier to collect and hence we are able to utilize 
annual data, and it contains complete biographical information on all directors as well as their 
                                                 
16 Rule 14a-3(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires proxy statements to furnish current information about 
nominees for directorships (Klein 1998).   14 
tenure of service and their holdings of the firm’s stock.  The major disadvantage is that the data 
extend back only to 1977.  For this reason we analyze both data sources independently.
18 
3.3 Preliminary Data Analysis 
  Figure 3 presents the proportion of all directors who are Washington lawyers for all firms, 
regulated, and unregulated firms by year.  Since none of the lines of business in the natural gas 
industry were regulated in 1930, the unregulated and total columns are identical. Of the 80 
directors located in Marquis for 1930, we find none fitting our definition of Washington lawyers.  
The number of Washington lawyers is rising until 1970 and begins to fall thereafter. At its highest 
in 1970, over 4% of board members fit our definition of Washington lawyers. This rise and fall is 
consistent with the external environment hypothesis that regulation requires firms to focus attention 
on the political process.  More interesting perhaps is that the proportion of Washington lawyer 
board members is always higher on regulated firms relative to unregulated firms.  The one 
exception is 1955 when our sample, by coincidence, does not include any unregulated firms. 
  As shown in Figure 4, the proportion of non-Washington lawyers, defined as all lawyers not 
meeting the above criteria, rises after 1930 but falls in several decades. Perhaps the best 
explanation for the rise of lawyers generally is the increasing size of government.  Regulation is 
just one aspect of the interaction between industry and government and a number of reasons for 
having legal knowledge on corporate boards did not change with deregulation.  It is also worth 
noting that while the federal rate regulation for production ended in 1986, other federal regulations 
remain and many states retain regulations.  We would not expect the 1986 deregulation to end the 
role of lawyers on corporate boards. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
17 The number of firms in the sample increases after 1988 when the SEC began to require broader use of electronic 
filings.  Prior to 1988, the number of electronic filings is dramatically lower, and paper copies of filings are not readily 
available, even from the SEC itself.  
18 Although proxy statements exist prior to 1978 our efforts to obtain them from the SEC met with limited success.  We decided to 
confine the analysis of proxy statements to the post 1978 period after receiving several blank sheets of paper from the SEC with 
“Best Available Copy” stamped on them.   15 
  In the case of politicians the evidence is less clear. We define a politician as any elected 
official plus other high-ranking heads of agencies not associated with the regulation of natural 
gas.
19 For example, Figure 5 shows that in 1960 the proportion of politicians on unregulated boards 
is higher than on regulated boards, but in 1970 and 1980 we find no politicians on the boards of 
unregulated companies.  One possible interpretation of this result is that politicians do not have the 
expertise that Washington lawyers (or former regulators-see below) have.  Another possible 
explanation is that legislative ethics rules may have precluded elected officials from serving on 
boards of companies that are subject to direct industry regulation.  
  In Figure 6 we see former regulators following a trend very similar to Washington lawyers.  
Former regulators are defined as former employees of either federal or state regulatory agencies 
charged with regulating the natural gas industry. Again we find no former regulators in 1930.  
Given the relative lack of regulation such a finding is not surprising.  In 1940 and 1950 regulators 
are more common on unregulated companies. Thereafter, as with Washington lawyers, the number 
of regulators as a fraction of located directors rises until 1970, then falls. Again, post-1955 
regulators are also more common on regulated companies. 
  The composites measures in Figures 7-10 show similar trends.  In particular, Composites 1 
and 4, which include board members that are in at least one of the four categories or are 
Washington lawyers and regulators, respectively, increase as a proportion of board members after 
regulation and fall after deregulation.  In the case of Composite 1, nearly 15% of the identified 
directors in 1970 could be categorized as some type of political director (the bulk, of course, are 
non-Washington lawyers). Because Composite 1 includes non-Washington lawyers and politicians, 
its fall is not a dramatic as for Composite 4.  In sum, a trend toward more legal knowledge on the 
                                                 
19 For example we count State Department Officials and Ambassadors as politicians but would count the head of the Energy 
Department as a regulator.   16 
board through time is clearly present, but that trend partially reverses for Washington lawyers and 
regulators following deregulation. 
  Figures 11 and 12 present two additional pieces of evidence on corporate boards.  Figure 11 
presents the percentage of insiders on the board, defined as employees of the firms, and seems to 
suggest that regulated firms are monitored no less carefully than are unregulated firms (a possibility 
we explore below).  The fraction of insiders has declined for all firms between 1930 and 1990 but 
the overall decline has been greater among regulated firms.  The evidence on board size in Figure 
12 suggests a further link between regulation and governance. Although we find no general decline 
in the size of natural gas companies’ boards, unregulated firms consistently have smaller boards.  
Thus, regulated boards are larger, but include a greater percentage of outsiders.  This is consistent 
with the idea that, in a regulated environment, firms add additional board members with expertise 
relevant to the firm’s environment.  We do not include diagrams of our other director types but will 
discuss them further in the regression results below. Overall, the preliminary evidence in Figures 3-
10 suggests that the function of political directors is in part dependent on the regulatory process. 
  The annual proxy statement data is largely consistent with the Moody’s data.  Figures 13-16 
present data on the four measures of political directors and Figures 17-21 reflects the composite 
measures.  In each case, the proportion of political directors is higher on boards of regulated firms 
relative to non-regulated companies.
20  In the case of Washington lawyers and former regulators, 
the proportion of these director types on unregulated boards also appears to be a downward trend, 
although the trend does appear to reverse itself in the late 1990s.   
  Finally, neither of our other measures of corporate governance, the proportion of insiders or 
board size, shows a systematic trend (see Figures 22 and 23, respectively).  Regulated firms have a 
slightly lower proportion of insiders post-1986, consistent with the Moody’s data and contrary to 
the “regulators as weak monitors” argument.  Also, the boards of regulated companies again appear   17 
to be larger than those of unregulated firms.  In the next section, we control for factors such as 
industry by including other variables. 
 
IV. Estimation and Results 
4.1 Control Variables for the Moody’s Dataset 
Moody's provides firm specific data that we use as controls given previous findings in the 
literature.  Moody’s contains consistent information on the firm's sales, its line(s) of business, and 
the size of its board.  Because sales numbers may not be directly comparable from decade to 
decade, we construct a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was in the bottom quartile of sales 
for a given year and a similar variable for firms in the top quartile.  Klein (1998) posits that larger 
firms may have greater information needs suggesting that lawyers, accountants, consultants, 
academics and even outside CEOs are likely to be more common the boards of larger firms. Further 
larger firms would also have larger boards.  In addition, the benefits of political directors may have 
the elements of a public good (Olson 1971).   Lobbying to prevent lower regulated prices is likely 
to benefit all firms in the industry.  Thus we would predict that smaller firms would be less likely to 
have political directors because the temptation to free ride is greater given that a larger proportion 
of the benefits will be received by other firms. 
We construct a series of non-exclusive dummy variables equal to one if the firm is a 
holding company (i.e. owns other companies and hence would be covered by the 1935 act), 
engages in exploration for natural gas, production of natural gas, operates a natural gas pipeline, 
and/or engages in the distribution of natural gas to retail or residential customers. We also include a 
control for firms which hold leases that are produced by other firms.  These variables control for 
                                                                                                                                                                 
20 Again given the limited number of companies (4) in 1978 there are no unregulated firms.   18 
the general economic environment common to all firms in a specific segment of the industry.
21  
Finally, we include the size of the board, as the opportunity cost of a given director type is likely to 
change as the board size grows.  It is not obvious that as the board increases the new additions will 
be of any particular type however adding a political director (or any type) to a board consisting of 4 
members may involve a greater cost than adding such a director to a board of 20. 
For the Moody’s sample, we define a firm as regulated in a given year if 1) it lists one of its 
lines of business as a holding, pipeline, or distribution company in any year after 1930, and/or 2) it 
lists production as a line of business in the 1955-1980 period.  We construct a categorical variable 
equal to one if the line of business is regulated in a given sample year and zero otherwise.  The 
regulated variable is coded as one if any of the firm’s lines of business is regulated in a given 
sample year.  The summary statistics are given in Panel A of Table 2. 
4.2 Control Variables for the Proxy Dataset  
  The independent variables for the proxy dataset come from both the firms’ proxy statements 
and COMPUSTAT.  We again define a dichotomous categorical regulation variable, coded as a one 
for production operations in firm years prior to deregulation (pre-1986) and zero afterward.  
Distribution and pipeline operations are coded one throughout the sample and exploration activities 
are coded zero. As before, the regulation variable is coded one if any of the firm’s lines of business 
is regulated. Panel B of Table 2 contains summary statistics of the sample. 
Although we know of no specific theory suggesting what factors determine what type of 
director (i.e. banker, lawyer, CEO) will be placed on a board, existing theories do provide some 
guidance.  First, there is an optimal board size determined in part by free riding and information 
problems (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996).  This suggests an opportunity cost associated with 
adding a board member of any particular type, since arbitrary additions would lead to overly large 
                                                 
21 Ideally, we would like to have some performance measures, but Moody's data is limited in its stock information for all but the 
largest companies.  We have far better performance measures for our proxy statement sample.   19 
boards.  For this reason it is important to control for factors other than regulation in the firm’s 
external environment.  For example, a firm with more debt might find greater value in adding a 
banker to the board rather than a “political” director, despite the presence of regulation. 
More specifically we include three controls for the general characteristics of the board.  We 
include the average age of the board and the average years of service of the board to control for the 
likelihood of exit from the board.  We would expect that boards with higher turnover might be 
more responsive to changes in the external environment.  For example a long serving board might 
have fewer political directors simply because there have not been any exits to allow a new 
appointment.  For reasons discussed above we also include the firm’s board size. 
  The external monitoring function of the board is proxied by the return on equity, the 
concentration of ownership among board members, and CEO tenure. Return on equity is included 
because previous studies have demonstrated that poor performance increases the likelihood that 
outside directors are placed on the board.  Directors of each background type could serve a 
monitoring function. We posit relatives of the CEO are the least effective monitors.  Thus, 
presuming that each director’s professional background provides some expertise for monitoring the 
CEO, we would expect all director types except relatives of the CEO to increase during periods of 
poor performance. We would also expect CEO tenure to be inversely related to each outside 
director type while positively related to the number of insiders and relatives. Also companies that 
are performing well or have long serving CEOs also have more insiders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2001).  As political directors are usually outsiders, we might expect, for example, that long serving 
CEOs would have fewer political directors on their boards because the boards are stocked with 
friendly insiders. Finally, if diversity of occupation types serves to enhance monitoring, we would 
expect the concentration of ownership among the board to be inversely related with each 
professional type but positively related to the number of insiders and relatives.  This is because as   20 
stock ownership by the board increases (thereby more closely aligning their incentives with those 
of shareholders) the need for additional outside monitors decreases.  
  Our primary measure of the firm’s external environment is, as with the Moody’s data, the 
firm’s line of business and whether the firm is regulated.
 22  The dichotomous regulation variable 
and the debt/asset ratio capture the external environment of the firm.  The expectations for political 
directors with respect to the regulation variable are discussed above.  We also expect bankers are 
more common when firms have larger amounts of debt.  Finally, we include the firm’s sales as a 
proxy for firm size. 
4.3 Estimation Procedure 
Because the dependant variable is a count of the number of directors of each type on the 
board, ordinary least squares will be bias and inconsistent.  Following Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988), we estimate a Poisson model.  If we define  l  to be  log() X lb = , where X is the 
independent variables and  b  are the coefficient estimates, then the probability of n board members 
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where Ci is a constant, nijt is the number of directors of type i at firm j in period t.  N is the total 
number of firms and T is the total number of years. 
4.4 Results from the Moody’s Data 
  The cross sectional results for the Moody’s-Marquis sample are presented in Table 3 Panel 
A.  We find that regulated firms have on average 1.138 more Washington lawyers on their boards 
than unregulated firms.  Given an average board size of around 9 this represents a sizable increase.  
We find a similar but smaller effect for non-Washington lawyers, with regulated firms having an   21 
average of .304 more non-Washington lawyers.  Former regulators are also more common on the 
boards of regulated companies.  Regulated companies have 1 more regulator than non-regulated 
firms.  Consistent with our preliminary data analysis, only former politicians show no significant 
difference between regulated and unregulated firms.  Not surprisingly the composite measures are 
generally significant.  Composite 1 (all four political director types), Composite 2 (Washington 
lawyers, politicians and regulators) and Composite 4 (Washington lawyers and regulators) are 
statistically significant.  Only Composite 3 (politicians and regulators) is not significantly different 
across regulated and unregulated boards. 
Consistent with our predictions all types of political directors are less common on the 
boards of smaller firms and more common on the boards of large firms (defined as the top and 
bottom quartile of sales for the given year).  In general the impact is between .614 and 1.718 
political directors smaller for bottom quartile firms and .253 to .907 larger for top quartile firms.  
This is consistent with our conjecture that smaller firms free ride in the provision of lobbying 
services to the industry. In addition larger boards consistently have more political directors 
suggesting that larger boards have a lower opportunity cost of adding political directors. The 
remainder of the results are more mixed.  We find lease holders have more non-Washington 
lawyers and extraction companies have few politicians while distribution companies have fewer 
Washington lawyers.  However, neither of these results is replicated in the Proxy statement data.  
As the results from the control variables are similar in the alternative specification we confine our 
attention to the coefficients on regulation in subsequent discussions of the Moody’s political 
directors results. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
22 The proxy statements and COMPUSTAT SIC codes do not identify companies which hold leases for other production companies 
nor holding companies independently from the other categories.   22 
4.4.1 Results Moody’s Panel Estimation 
  Following Hermalin and Weisbach we also estimate the model using fixed effects, because 
there may be firm-specific characteristics that do not change through time, but are not captured by 
the dependent variables.
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where C2 is a constant and Xjs is the within firm average of the dependent variables. 
  Panel B of Table 3 presents the fixed effects estimation for the Moody’s data.  The fixed 
effects estimation is problematic given the criteria for firm observations: a firm must exist in at 
least two periods, those periods must cover a regulatory event (i.e. regulation or deregulation), and 
the firm must have at least one of the director types in question during the sample period.  The last 
criterion is particularly problematic as we know from the preliminary data analysis that a number 
of unregulated firms simply do not have certain director types on their boards.  The reduction in 
sample size is evident in the number-of-observations and number-of-companies rows.  For 
example, in the case of Washington lawyers only 58 of the 412 firms in the Moody’s sample meet 
the criteria, leaving us with 212 observations.  Not surprisingly, only the model estimating the 
number former regulators is statistically significant, indicating regulation resulted in a given firm 
adding 1.268 more former regulators to its board. Results for all of the other political directors, 
though not significant, are positive. The composite measures are more precisely estimated owing to 
a larger sample size.  For Composites 2, 3 and 4 we find statistically significant increases, on the 
order of 0.827 to 0.999 additional political directors, when a firm is regulated.  Thus even when we 
control for firm specific effects we find evidence that regulation induces a shift toward political 
directors on the boards of the same firm. 
                                                 
23 One might ask why include both cross-sectional and panel results.  The simple answer is that the cross-sectional results allow us to 
explore the possibility that firms entering the market post deregulation may have fewer political directors than incumbent and/or 
exiting firms.   23 
4.4.2 Newly Appointed Directors 
  The evidence presented above suggests that regulation induces firms to retain “political” 
directors. Both the fixed effect and cross sectional models suppose that a political director can be 
removed from the board in any year.  There are, of course, reasons why a company might wish to 
retain political board members even if their political connections are no longer valuable for the 
firm. Directors with long service might have developed firm specific knowledge over their tenure 
on the board that warrants their retention.  In addition, board members are frequently elected to 
multiple-year terms and are not likely to be dismissed mid-term.  To control for this we re-estimate 
the above models examining only newly appointed directors.  In the Moody’s sample we determine 
new directors by examining the board in the first year the company appears in the data (say 1960) 
and we assume that all directors are continuing.  We then move to the next period (1970) and code 
all directors not on the board in the previous period as new.  Using this definition, and given the 
number of firms that appear only once, the number of new directors is relatively small and our 
sample size is reduced to 411.
24 
  The results, presented in Table 3 Panel C, indicate that regulated firms appoint more non-
Washington lawyers and former regulators to be new directors.  On average, the regulated firms 
appoint 0.844 more non-Washington lawyers and 1.423 more former regulators to new 
directorships.  Results for Washington lawyers and former politicians are not significant although 
both are positive.  Again, the composite measures are generally significant.  Only composite 3 
(former regulators and politicians) is not statistically significant. 
  Panel D presents results of the new director model using firm specific fixed effects.  The 
sample size is too small to permit meaningful analysis for several of the categories.  There are too 
few newly appointed former regulators meeting our fixed effect criteria to estimate the model.  
                                                 
24 Note our technique for identifying new directors means that all directors are classified as continuing the first year the firm appears 
in our data.   24 
Washington lawyers are more common.  The model indicates that for a given regulated firm, 2.424 
more Washington lawyers are newly appointed.  Again, the composite measures are more precisely 
estimated, with all four being statistically significant and positive.  In all other cases, newly 
appointed political directors are more common on the boards of regulated firms. 
4.4.3 Regulation and Other Director Types 
  Table 4 presents the results for the other types of directors.  We find little or no evidence 
that regulation affects the selection of other types of directors. The only statistically significant 
differences are that outside CEOs with experience in the gas industry and consultants are more 
common on regulated boards. One explanation for the CEO result, which we hope to explore in 
future research, is the Holding Company Act of 1935, which broke up the industry, possibly 
encouraging interlocking directorships.
25 In addition to specific director types, the number of 
insiders and board size do not differ significantly across regulated and unregulated firms.   
  Firm size is a significant determinant of board size. Firms in the bottom quartile of sales 
have smaller boards and firms in the top quartile having larger boards.  In addition firms in the 
bottom quartile of sales have few bankers, outside experienced CEOs, engineers and academics.  
Larger firms also have few outside CEOs but more engineers and academics as well as more 
insiders generally.  The results also indicate that exploration companies have slightly larger boards 
and fewer insiders while pipeline companies have larger boards.  In addition exploration companies 
have more academics and fewer accounts.  In sum we find no general patterns in the backgrounds 
of non-political directors related to the regulatory environment.  Nor do we find evidence that 
regulated firms are less actively monitored that non-regulated firms. 
                                                 
25 Our results from the proxy data regressions indicate that outside CEO’s with experience in the gas industry are less likely during 
regulation. Owing to the different sample periods there are not inconsistent, but caution should be exercised in interpreting the cause 
of this relationship.   25 
4.5 Proxy Statement Sample 
  Table 5 presents results of the models using the proxy statement data for the period 1978 to 
1998.  Panel A contains the cross sectional results.  Consistent with the Moody’s data, we find 
Washington lawyers are more common on the boards of regulated firms.  On average the boards of 
regulated firms have 1.018 more Washington lawyers than non-regulated firms.  Non-Washington 
lawyers are also more common; with an average 0.657 more on the boards of regulated firms.  The 
coefficient on regulators is positive but not significant.  In addition, all of the composite measures 
except Composite 3 (politicians and regulators) are statistically significant, indicating between 
0.491 and 0.888 additional political directors depending on the measure. 
  The most robust finding in the control variables is consistent with the Moody’s sample.  
Larger firms, measured by firm sales, have more political directors on their board.  The results also 
indicate that longer serving boards are more likely to have political directors (except Washington 
lawyers).  One reason is that longer duration boards may be capturing the effect of directors 
appointed prior to the first efforts at deregulation in 1977.  The Moody’s sample suggests that the 
decline in the number of political directors actually begins before 1980.  Also consistent with the 
Moody’s sample we find that larger boards generally have more political directors. Finally 
Washington lawyers and non-Washington lawyers are less common on firms with higher debt to 
assets ratios. 
  As with the Moody’s data, the fixed effects model (Panel B) requires a greatly reduced 
sample size (ranging from 221 to 587, depending on political category, versus 685 in the cross-
sectional model).  Nevertheless, we find that Washington lawyers are more common on boards of 
regulated companies.  We also find Composite 4 (Washington lawyers and regulators) is 
statistically significant and positive, indicating about 0.477 more directors who are either 
Washington lawyers and/or former regulators on the boards of regulated firms.   26 
  Finally, Panel C presents results for the model examining only newly appointed directors.  
Here again we find Washington lawyers are more commonly appointed as new directors to the 
boards of regulated firms.  Likewise, Composite 4 shows a similar statistically significant increase 
in the number of newly appointed Washington lawyers and/or former regulators when the company 
is regulated. 
  Table 6 presents results on the determinants for other director types using the proxy 
statement data.  In general, the results indicate little difference between the boards of regulated 
companies and unregulated companies in the numbers of other director types.  We do find that 
regulation having exactly the opposite effect on the number of outside CEO with experience in the 
natural gas industry from what we observed for the Moody’s data.  One reason for this maybe the 
Moody’s sample’s longer time period, however caution is warranted in drawing any conclusions.  
The results also indicate a small and weakly significant difference in the number of insiders on the 
board due to regulation.  Regulated firm, in contrast to expectations, have fewer insiders. 
  The results for the control variables suggest that, consistent with our expectations, firms 
with higher returns on equity have boards with more insiders. Similarly a higher concentration of 
stock ownership by the board is correlated with more insiders.  The former suggests that 
shareholders do not feel the need to monitor successful firms while the latter suggests that 
monitoring is less important when the board owns a larger share of the company.  Increases in 
board size result in larger numbers of a variety of director types and increases in firm size result in 
larger boards generally.  There are a number of other findings such as pipeline and distribution 
companies having large boards and distribution companies having more bankers but as with the 
Moody’s data none of the findings in the control variables changes our interpretation of regulations 
affect on board composition.   27 
4.6 Estimating the Effect of Regulation with No Control Variables 
  One recurring problem in studies of corporate boards is endogeneity.  Many of the 
independent variables used as determinates may in fact be determined by the same factors 
determining the dependent variable.  In the context of director types for example board size might 
determine board composition as it represents the opportunity cost of an additional director.  
However, other studies have found board size to be determined by regulation.  We lack instruments 
to control for all the potentially endogenous variables in the model.  However, we feel confident 
that the presence or absence of regulation itself is exogenous, regardless of the various ways it may 
affect the size and composition of the board.  Therefore, we re-estimate the models without control 
variables.  The results are presented in Table 7 Panel A-G.  They are best interpreted as the total 
impact of regulation on board composition independent of regulations impact on board composition 
though board size.  In general, the results are similar without the control variables although the 
significance levels are generally higher suggesting that either there is some multicolinearity 
between the presence of regulation and the control variables. 
V. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we examine the role of “political” directors on the boards of regulated 
companies.  There are three possible explanations for the presence of these directors. The first 
explanation is that these directors play an advising role, providing information, expertise and/or 
political access to resources relative to the firm’s external environment.  The second explanation is 
that “political” directors serve the same function as other directors, namely to monitor the CEO.  
They simply have a different background from other directors.  Finally, it is possible that 
“political” directors are on the boards of regulated firms as window dressing—they are poor 
monitors and unlikely to challenge the CEO.  If this is the case, “political” directors are associated 
with regulation because regulated firms may be subject to less managerial discipline.   28 
  We test these hypotheses using data from Moody's Industrial Manuals and Marquis Who's 
Who in Commerce and Industry covering the period 1930 to 1990.  We examine the regulation of 
natural gas producers in 1954 and the 1986 deregulation of wellhead natural gas prices. We also 
estimate the impacts of deregulation using data from proxy statements covering the 1978 to 1998 
period. We estimate the effect of regulation on the number of “political” directors using both cross 
sectional and fixed-effect comparisons of regulated and unregulated firms.  We also analyze the 
number of directors with political backgrounds that are newly appointed to boards of regulated and 
unregulated firms. 
The results presented in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that “political” 
directors are added to boards primarily for their regulatory expertise, whether it is used for rent 
seeking purposes (Stigler, 1971), to protect the firm's quasi-rents from regulation (McChesney, 
1997) or simply to advise management as it navigates its regulatory environment.  Directors with a 
political background, such as Washington and non-Washington lawyers, former politicians, and 
former regulators are all, by various measures, more likely to serve on boards of firms that are 
subject to regulation and become less likely to serve on boards of firms when regulation is 
removed.  Thus, their value as directors appears tied to the presence of regulation not their general 
monitoring ability. 
  We do find evidence of changes in the composition of corporate boards in the 1930-90 
sample period. For example the number of inside directors on corporate boards falls during the 
1930 to 1990 period.  The link between these changes and regulation is tenuous at best.  Moreover, 
our conclusion stands up to the argument that “political” directors are simply management stooges 
that can be afforded under less-competitive, regulated environments.  We examine the possibility 
that regulated firms are simply less effectively monitored and hence have more directors with a 
political background simply because they are less effective monitors than other types of directors.    29 
By a variety of traditional corporate finance measures, we find no evidence that regulated 
companies are less effectively monitored than non-regulated firms.   
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Table 1    Sample Summary 
 
This table describes the size of the sample, by year, for each observation year and each dataset.  Panel A 
shows the number of firms listed in the decade volumes of Moody's Industrial Manual as being in the 
petroleum industry with a natural gas line of business and the total number of directors on their boards.  The 
firms listed for 1955 are taken from the 1950 Moody’s publication, hence the same number of firms in those 
two years.  The Located Directors column refers to those directors listed by Moody's for whom we are able 
to collect biographical data from Marquis Who's Who in Commerce and Industry or Who's Who in Finance 
and Industry.  Panel B shows the number of firms identified in COMPUSTAT as operating in the natural gas 
industry for which proxy statements could be obtained with information on board directors, and the number 
of individual directors. 
 
Panel A: Moody’s-Marquis Sample  
Year  Total Directors  Located Directors  Firms 
  Number  Number  Percent located  Number 
1930  141  80  56.74  15 
1940  700  476  68  80 
1950  583  451  77.36  61 
1955  584  448  76.71  61 
1960  1232  840  68.18  127 
1970  826  572  69.25  82 
1980  1478  934  63.19  162 
1990  982  539  54.89  107 
 
Panel B: Proxy Statement Sample 
Year  Number of Firms  Number of Directors 
1978  4  26 
1979  16  135 
1980  17  148 
1981  23  197 
1982  25  210 
1983  29  243 
1984  32  268 
1985  29  235 
1986  27  228 
1987  29  232 
1988  27  246 
1989  45  414 
1990  43  421 
1991  44  421 
1992  45  472 
1993  43  435 
1994  46  466 
1995  43  418 
1996  44  412 
1997  41  380 
1998  33  319 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the data variables for both samples used in the paper.  
Panel A reports the numbers for the pooled Moody’s-Marquis dataset.  This sample includes 4,340 director 
observations from 615 firm-years over the period 1930-90.  Panel B reports the sample means and standard 
deviations for the Proxy Statement sample, which includes annual data from 1978-98 for 685 firm-years and 
6,326 director observations.   
 
Panel A – Moody’s-Marquis Sample 1930, 40, 50, 55, 60, 70, 80, 90     
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Board Director Characteristics:     
Number of Washington Lawyers (a)  .2565217  .577261 
Number of non-Washington Lawyers (b)  .615942  .9356856 
Number of former Politicians ( c)  .184058  .4783023 
Number of former Regulators (d)  .1913043  .5036122 
Composite 1 (a, b, c and d)  .8971014  1.186336 
Composite 2 (a, c and d)  .4797101  .8348504 
Composite 3 (c and d)  .3072464  .6564006 
Composite 4 (a and c)  .3782609  .7271172 
Number of Bankers  .7173913  1.054324 
Number of Outside Experienced CEO  .5318841  .9236441 
Number of Engineer or Geologists  .5753623  .8791911 
Number of Consultants  .0942029  .3509821 
Number of Retirees of the company  .0550725  .2636884 
Number of Relatives of the CEO  .0666667  .32086 
Number of Accountants  .4072464  .5933396 
Number of Academics  .1463768  .4822178 
     
Board Characteristics:     
Number of Insiders  3.604348  2.009768 
Number of Board Members  9.3  4.080628 
     
Firm Characteristics:     
Regulated  .7550725  .4295122 
Companies in the bottom sales quartile for the current year  .3111882  .4623471 
Companies in the top sales quartile for the current year  .1936853  .3950503 
Proportion of company years in which the company is a holding company  .0594203  .2365811 
Proportion of company years in which the company holds land leases developed by other companies  .4442374  .4967032 
Proportion of company years in which the company engages in exploration  .5888889  .4918188 
Proportion of company years in which the company engages in extraction  .8869565  .3214233 
Proportion of company years in which the company operates a pipeline  .2697723  .4433791 
Proportion of company years in which the company engages in distribution  .4132505  .4920675 
   34 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B – Proxy Statement Sample 1978-98     
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Board Director Characteristics:     
Number of Washington Lawyers (a)  .4554745  .7233491 
Number of non-Washington Lawyers (b)  .870073  1.04114 
Number of former Politicians ( c)  .5153285  1.145222 
Number of former Regulators (d)  .3737226  .8292241 
Composite 1 (a, b, c and d)  1.544526  1.774532 
Composite 2 (a, c and d)  .8627737  1.308486 
Composite 3 (c and d)  .589781  1.182059 
Composite 4 (a and c)  .6525547  1.019767 
Number of Bankers  1.90073  1.773443 
Number of Outside Experienced CEO  .979562  1.153252 
Number of Engineer or Geologists  .6394161  1.150855 
Number of Consultants  .7927007  1.01492 
Number of Retirees of the company  .2277372  .5359489 
Number of Relatives of the CEO  .2262774  .5157278 
Number of Accountants  .4248175  .7228296 
Number of Academics  .4452555  .8387518 
     
Board Characteristics:     
Number of Insiders  2.626277  1.670315 
Number of Board Members  9.255474  4.638431 
Average years of service of board  9.123122  4.402134 
Average age of the board  59.19626  6.530359 
% Equity held by Board  9.992701  20.51411 
CEO Tenure  11.05715  9.779333 
     
Firm Characteristics:     
Proportion of regulated firm-years  .4686131  .4993785 
Proportion of company years in which the company engages in extraction  .7532847  .4314146 
Proportion of company years in which the company engages in exploration  .2773723  .4480289 
Proportion of company years in which the company operates a pipeline  .2058394  .4046091 
Proportion of company years in which the company engages in distribution  .1270073  .3332245 
Rate of return on equity  -3.325007  194.1794 
Debt/Assets  .297738  .2334445 
Sales  895.908  2771.406 
 
 
 Table 3: The impact of regulation on the number of political board members by type Moody's Marquis Data 1930-90 
This table reports the results of a poison model estimating the number of board members of each director type.  The four composite types are defined as follows: 
Composite 1 includes all four “political” types; Composite 2, Washington Lawyers, Politicians, and Regulators; Composite 3, Politicians and Regulators; Composite 4, 
Washington Lawyers and Regulators.  Each specification includes controls for line of business (exploration, production, pipeline, distribution and holding company), 
board size and firm size (bottom quartile of sales for the sample year and top quartile of sales for the sample year). 
Panel A: Cross Sectional Estimation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















Regulated  1.138***  0.304*  0.083  1.000***  0.379**  0.764***  0.446  1.069*** 
  (0.340)  (0.179)  (0.364)  (0.337)  (0.157)  (0.245)  (0.303)  (0.268) 
Board Size  0.077***  0.083***  0.080***  0.088***  0.082***  0.077***  0.083***  0.076*** 
  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Is the Company in the bottom sales quartile for the 
current year? 
-0.765***  -0.614***  -1.718***  -0.788**  -0.733***  -0.933***  -1.094***  -0.776*** 
  (0.261)  (0.191)  (0.393)  (0.339)  (0.156)  (0.205)  (0.298)  (0.212) 
Is the Company in the top sales quartile for the current 
year? 
0.304  -0.018  0.907**  0.527*  0.253*  0.524**  0.722***  0.340 
  (0.295)  (0.177)  (0.385)  (0.302)  (0.149)  (0.210)  (0.280)  (0.235) 
Is the company a holding company?  -0.082  0.003  -0.370  0.483  0.062  -0.037  0.107  0.108 
  (0.264)  (0.280)  (0.372)  (0.310)  (0.210)  (0.197)  (0.272)  (0.228) 
Does the company holds land leases developed by other 
companies? 
0.027  0.257**  0.155  0.057  0.136  -0.004  0.035  -0.032 
  (0.169)  (0.111)  (0.171)  (0.212)  (0.090)  (0.126)  (0.155)  (0.143) 
Does the company engage in exploration?  0.215  -0.106  -0.137  -0.211  -0.026  0.048  -0.097  0.085 
  (0.221)  (0.139)  (0.220)  (0.232)  (0.107)  (0.150)  (0.189)  (0.171) 
Does the company engage in extraction?  -0.259  -0.116  -0.658**  0.005  -0.102  -0.321**  -0.369  -0.057 
  (0.265)  (0.186)  (0.270)  (0.255)  (0.120)  (0.158)  (0.241)  (0.210) 
Does the company operate a pipeline?  -0.258  0.114  -0.250  -0.353  0.019  -0.173  -0.225  -0.205 
  (0.197)  (0.135)  (0.230)  (0.268)  (0.113)  (0.154)  (0.203)  (0.172) 
Does the company engage in distribution?  -0.500**  0.075  -0.340  -0.372  -0.084  -0.350**  -0.287  -0.376** 
  (0.206)  (0.125)  (0.304)  (0.227)  (0.101)  (0.144)  (0.206)  (0.156) 
Constant  -2.616***  -1.449***  -1.707***  -3.061***  -1.083***  -1.634***  -1.833***  -2.328*** 
  (0.510)  (0.294)  (0.433)  (0.485)  (0.226)  (0.321)  (0.386)  (0.397) 
Observations  672  672  672  672  672  672  672  672 
Robust standard errors clustered on firms in parentheses 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1%   1 
Table 3 Continued 
Model:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 









Composite 1  Composite 2  Composite 3  Composite 4 
Panel B: Firm Specific Fixed Effects 
Regulated Firms  0.700  0.179  0.538  1.268**  0.301  0.863***  0.999***  0.827** 
  (0.446)  (0.236)  (0.487)  (0.503)  (0.201)  (0.319)  (0.386)  (0.353) 
Observations  212  305  155  165  338  269  221  254 
Number of 
companies 
58  93  41  47  106  80  64  74 
Panel C: Cross Sectional Results for New Directors Only 
Regulated Firms  0.918  0.844**  0.226  1.423**  0.827**  1.007*  0.771  1.172** 
  (0.573)  (0.332)  (0.696)  (0.564)  (0.375)  (0.545)  (0.623)  (0.466) 
Observations  411  411  411  411  411  411  411  411 
Panel D: Firm Specific Fixed Effects New Directors Only 
Regulated Firms  2.424*  0.670  -0.224  NA  1.792***  2.467***  2.062*  3.184** 
  (1.273)  (0.706)  (0.997)  NA  (0.671)  (0.934)  (1.078)  (1.239) 
Observations  119  137  81  NA  153  134  104  127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
For non-fixed effects estimation standard errors clustered on firm 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: The impact of regulation on the number of other board members by type Moody's Marquis Data 1930-90 
This table reports the results of a poison model estimating the number of board members of each non-political director type.   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  Insiders  Board 
Size 
Bankers  Outside CEO 
with Experience 
Engineers  Consultants  Retirees  Relatives  Accountants  Academics 
Regulated  -0.011  0.042  0.186  0.486***  -0.172  0.978**  0.796  0.586  -0.072  0.126 
  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.153)  (0.185)  (0.158)  (0.487)  (0.759)  (0.466)  (0.145)  (0.392) 
Board Size  0.047***  NA  0.089***  0.082***  0.061***  0.099***  0.083**  0.073**  0.007  0.074*** 
  (0.004)    (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Is the Company in the bottom sales 
quartile for the current year? 
-0.055  -0.299***  -0.713***  -0.687***  -0.515**  -0.300  -0.367  -0.394  0.243  -0.995** 
  (0.049)  (0.043)  (0.198)  (0.194)  (0.244)  (0.396)  (0.772)  (0.500)  (0.158)  (0.411) 
Is the Company in the top sales quartile 
for the current year? 
0.248***  0.294***  -0.220  -0.412**  0.548***  -0.088  0.638  -0.647  0.017  0.768** 
  (0.065)  (0.058)  (0.155)  (0.202)  (0.138)  (0.515)  (0.445)  (0.728)  (0.223)  (0.376) 
Is the company a holding company?  -0.021  -0.080  0.064  0.265  0.249  -0.220  -0.832  -1.561  0.117  -0.368 
  (0.084)  (0.053)  (0.218)  (0.290)  (0.179)  (0.593)  (0.916)  (1.051)  (0.341)  (0.638) 
Does the company holds land leases 
developed by other companies? 
0.054  -0.050  0.036  -0.115  0.006  -0.168  -0.125  -0.167  0.068  -0.469 
  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.107)  (0.129)  (0.109)  (0.310)  (0.377)  (0.385)  (0.139)  (0.303) 
Does the company engage in exploration?  -0.120**  0.090***  -0.063  -0.167  -0.224*  -0.017  0.385  0.551  -0.362***  0.735*** 
  (0.048)  (0.032)  (0.115)  (0.129)  (0.115)  (0.319)  (0.351)  (0.433)  (0.127)  (0.284) 
Does the company engage in extraction?  0.065  0.021  -0.158  -0.016  -0.129  0.373  -0.277  -0.428  0.066  -0.110 
  (0.086)  (0.055)  (0.161)  (0.262)  (0.127)  (0.561)  (0.647)  (0.476)  (0.314)  (0.512) 
Does the company operate a pipeline?  0.062  0.082**  0.083  0.244  0.137  -0.094  -0.187  -0.507  0.054  -0.619 
  (0.048)  (0.034)  (0.120)  (0.152)  (0.113)  (0.419)  (0.664)  (0.586)  (0.176)  (0.396) 
Does the company engage in distribution?  0.067  -0.059  0.246*  0.112  0.435**  0.057  -0.329  -0.407  0.168  0.342 
  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.128)  (0.176)  (0.188)  (0.519)  (0.645)  (0.501)  (0.165)  (0.390) 






-0.984***  -3.031*** 
  (0.101)  (0.068)  (0.269)  (0.342)  (0.240)  (0.874)  (0.925)  (0.754)  (0.334)  (0.657) 
Observations  672  672  672  672  672  672  672  672  672  672 
Robust standard errors clustered on firms in parentheses 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: The impact of regulation on the number of political board members by type Proxy statement data 1978-98 
This table reports the results of a poison model estimating the number of board members of each type of political director.  The four composite types are defined as 
follows: Composite 1 includes all four “political” types; Composite 2, Washington Lawyers, Politicians, and Regulators; Composite 3, Politicians and Regulators; 
Composite 4, Washington Lawyers and Regulators.   
Panel A: Cross Sectional Estimation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















Regulated  1.018***  0.657***  -0.123  0.797*  0.491***  0.568**  0.351  0.888*** 
  (0.374)  (0.232)  (0.362)  (0.436)  (0.173)  (0.276)  (0.359)  (0.339) 
Does the firm engage in production?  0.392  -0.365  0.782*  0.024  -0.038  0.281  0.379  0.027 
  (0.405)  (0.338)  (0.466)  (0.456)  (0.198)  (0.287)  (0.362)  (0.381) 
Does the firm engage in exploration?  -0.319  -0.303  0.468  -0.527  -0.062  0.087  0.496  -0.505 
  (0.422)  (0.318)  (0.466)  (0.742)  (0.210)  (0.369)  (0.460)  (0.464) 
Does the firm own a pipeline?  0.195  -0.080  1.389***  0.881  0.202  0.445  0.869*  0.335 
  (0.383)  (0.332)  (0.506)  (0.600)  (0.250)  (0.392)  (0.478)  (0.416) 
Does the firm engage in Distribution?  0.007  -0.629  -0.109  0.914  -0.303  0.140  0.662  0.178 
  (0.508)  (0.517)  (0.660)  (0.713)  (0.364)  (0.473)  (0.621)  (0.516) 
Average age of service on the board  0.066  0.058*  0.079*  0.096*  0.060**  0.070*  0.075*  0.076* 
  (0.042)  (0.031)  (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.025)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.043) 
Average age of the board  0.019  -0.045**  -0.016  -0.048  -0.025  -0.004  -0.021  -0.010 
  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Rate of return on equity  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.005**  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Debt/Assets  -1.534**  -0.915**  0.274  -1.583  -0.628**  -0.501  -0.082  -1.464** 
  (0.699)  (0.378)  (0.361)  (1.039)  (0.311)  (0.422)  (0.485)  (0.718) 
Board Size  0.025  0.049***  0.032*  0.058***  0.039***  0.029  0.040**  0.036* 
  (0.022)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.022) 
% Equity held by board  -0.002  -0.003  -0.017*  -0.018  -0.006  -0.014*  -0.022*  -0.010 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
Sales  0.507*  0.776***  0.722***  0.844***  0.765***  0.666***  0.816***  0.567** 
  (0.259)  (0.221)  (0.233)  (0.284)  (0.203)  (0.217)  (0.238)  (0.268) 
CEO Tenure  -0.008  -0.003  -0.042**  -0.027  -0.010  -0.017  -0.032*  -0.010 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.011) 
Constant  -3.369**  1.838*  -1.596  0.051  0.954  -1.235  -1.013  -1.080 
  (1.570)  (1.006)  (1.523)  (2.044)  (0.954)  (1.352)  (1.579)  (1.583) 
Observations  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685 
Robust standard errors clustered on Firms in parentheses 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 Continued 
 
Model:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 









Composite 1  Composite 2  Composite 3  Composite 4 
Panel B: Firm Specific Fixed Effects 
Regulated Firms  0.702***  0.160  -0.172  -0.177  0.229  0.291  -0.072  0.477** 
  (0.259)  (0.185)  (0.289)  (0.459)  (0.139)  (0.194)  (0.273)  (0.235) 
Observations  298  477  252  221  587  401  297  345 
Number of 
Companies 
31  55  26  25  64  43  31  38 
Panel C: Cross Sectional Results for New Directors Only 
Regulated Firms  0.801**  0.416**  -0.273  0.272  0.330  0.330  -0.083  0.647** 
  (0.333)  (0.174)  (0.434)  (0.479)  (0.294)  (0.294)  (0.407)  (0.306) 
Observations  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
For non-fixed effects estimation standard errors clustered on firm 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
   5 
Table 6: The impact of regulation on the number of non-political board members by type Proxy statement data 1978-98 
This table reports the results of a poison model estimating the number of board members of each type of non-political director 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  Insiders  Board 
Size 
Bankers  Experienced 
CEOs 
Engineers  Consultants  Retirees  Relatives  Accountants  Academics 
Regulated  -0.192*  -0.144**  -0.391**  -0.747***  0.016  -0.275  -0.208  -0.210  0.323  0.241 
  (0.116)  (0.070)  (0.158)  (0.258)  (0.354)  (0.244)  (0.412)  (0.419)  (0.294)  (0.601) 
Does the firm engage in production?  -0.163  0.059  0.304  0.039  0.350  0.326  0.000  0.850*  -0.150  -0.015 
  (0.119)  (0.071)  (0.254)  (0.328)  (0.516)  (0.359)  (0.703)  (0.488)  (0.502)  (0.426) 
Does the firm engage in exploration?  -0.319**  -0.061  0.286  0.100  0.052  -0.126  0.467  1.071*  -1.167*  0.741 
  (0.142)  (0.107)  (0.306)  (0.293)  (0.573)  (0.353)  (0.621)  (0.599)  (0.685)  (0.455) 
Does the firm own a pipeline?  -0.152  0.198*  0.017  -0.017  0.464  0.844***  0.467  0.005  0.905  1.823*** 
  (0.133)  (0.115)  (0.296)  (0.377)  (0.375)  (0.307)  (0.510)  (0.524)  (0.568)  (0.566) 
Does the firm engage in Distribution?  0.012  0.364***  0.901**  0.132  -1.756***  0.513  -0.700  0.947  0.044  0.764 
  (0.160)  (0.129)  (0.357)  (0.571)  (0.673)  (0.393)  (0.698)  (0.670)  (0.623)  (0.679) 
Average age of service on the board  0.005  -0.011  -0.023  -0.044  0.007  -0.044  0.005  0.111**  0.056  -0.019 
  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.045) 
Average age of the board  -0.023  0.005  -0.002  0.031  -0.009  0.019  0.175***  -0.068*  -0.077**  0.047 
  (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.046)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.031) 
Rate of return on equity  0.001**  -0.001*  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.002  0.000  0.004*  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Debt/Assets  -0.059  0.173  0.245  0.048  0.409  -0.082  1.475***  -1.655*  0.478  -0.334 
  (0.156)  (0.115)  (0.254)  (0.334)  (0.380)  (0.396)  (0.341)  (0.885)  (0.395)  (0.712) 
Board Size  0.028***    0.043***  0.023  0.009  0.039***  0.029  0.006  0.032  0.031* 
  (0.006)    (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.017) 
% Equity held by board  0.004*  -0.001  0.003  -0.004  -0.006  -0.004  -0.005  0.013*  -0.020  -0.033** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Sales  0.679***  0.363***  0.221  0.383  0.033  -1.513**  0.043  -6.498*  -0.802  -0.307 
  (0.119)  (0.111)  (0.184)  (0.313)  (0.246)  (0.741)  (0.195)  (3.651)  (0.640)  (0.220) 
CEO Tenure  0.004  -0.002  -0.003  0.017*  -0.008  0.008  -0.026  -0.027  0.005  -0.042*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
Constant  2.203***  1.926***  0.247  -1.607  -0.246  -1.576  -13.027***  1.026  2.742*  -4.067*** 
  (0.781)  (0.336)  (0.623)  (1.255)  (1.623)  (0.998)  (2.646)  (1.846)  (1.665)  (1.578) 
Observations  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685 
Robust standard errors clustered on firms in parentheses 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 The impact of regulation on the number of political directors estimated without control variables 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 









Composite 1  Composite 2  Composite 3  Composite 4 
Panel A: Moody’s Cross Section 
Regulated Firms  1.159***  0.650***  0.533  1.207***  0.717***  0.997***  0.821***  1.202*** 
  (0.325)  (0.189)  (0.369)  (0.312)  (0.179)  (0.249)  (0.300)  (0.248) 
Observations  672  672  672  672  672  672  672  672 
Panel B: Moody’s Firm Specific Fixed Effect 
Regulated Firms  0.797*  0.215  -0.120  0.910**  0.280  0.671**  0.520  0.813** 
  (0.409)  (0.223)  (0.389)  (0.408)  (0.189)  (0.286)  (0.320)  (0.323) 
Observations  212  305  155  165  338  269  221  254 
Number of 
companies 
58  93  41  47  106  80  64  74 
Panel C: Moody’s Cross Sectional Results New Directors Only 
Regulated Firms  1.007*  0.937***  0.401  1.303**  0.955**  1.099**  0.828  1.220*** 
  (0.544)  (0.334)  (0.667)  (0.515)  (0.383)  (0.543)  (0.613)  (0.447) 
Observations  411  411  411  411  411  411  411  411 
Panel D: Moody’s Firm Specific Effects New Directors Only 
Regulated Firms  1.840*  0.814  -0.014  NA  1.238**  1.684**  1.290*  2.241** 
  (1.069)  (0.639)  (0.909)    (0.550)  (0.763)  (0.781)  (1.060) 
Observations  119  137  81  NA  153  134  104  127 
Number of 
Companies 
23  28  16    33  28  22  26 
Panel E: Proxy Statement Cross Sectional Results 
Regulated Firms  1.509***  0.650**  1.117**  1.944***  0.792***  1.174***  1.254***  1.511*** 
  (0.358)  (0.273)  (0.483)  (0.439)  (0.275)  (0.342)  (0.425)  (0.339) 
Observations  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685 
Panel F: Proxy Data Firm Specific Fixed Effects 
Regulated Firms  0.525**  0.101  -0.507*  -0.029  0.048  0.078  -0.250  0.295 
  (0.239)  (0.174)  (0.271)  (0.382)  (0.133)  (0.182)  (0.254)  (0.219) 
Observations  298  477  252  221  587  401  297  345 
Number of 
Companies 
31  55  26  25  64  43  31  38 
Panel G: Proxy Data  Cross Sectional Results for New Directors Only 
Regulated Firms  1.405***  0.690**  1.109**  1.815***  0.834***  1.179***  1.247***  1.458*** 
  (0.353)  (0.288)  (0.491)  (0.443)  (0.284)  (0.343)  (0.430)  (0.336) 
Observations  685  685  685  685  685  685  685  685 
 
    
 
Figure 1: The vote breakdown for the 1949 Harris-Kerr bill (HR 1758), which specified that the 
Natural Gas Act of 1938 did not allow the Federal Power Commission to regulate producer 




Figure 2: The vote breakdown for the 1955 Harris-Fulbright bill, which deregulated natural gas 
producers following the Phillips case.  Districts in red voted for passage.  Districts in blue voted 
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